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"The guards used to tell me, 'You'll be here until you're dead."'
-Nestor Campbos of Cuba, recounting how
guards at Orleans Parish Prison in Louisiana described his detention.1
Introduction
Kestutis Zadvydas was born in 1948 to parents of Lithuanian ancestry in a
displaced-person camp in Germany. 2 He and his family immigrated to the
United States when he was eight years old.3 Though Zadvydas has since
married, had a daughter, 4 and lived a full life in America, he has never
f J.D., Cornell Law School, anticipated 2003; B.A., Carleton College, 1997. The
author thanks Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, Adjunct Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, for
his insightful comments, and his wife, Line M. Olsson, for her encouragement and
support. All errors and inconsistencies are the author's alone.
1. Human Rights Watch interview with Nestor Campos, New Orleans, Louisiana
(Mar. 23, 1997) (cited in Locked Away: Immigration Detainees in Jails in the United States,
10 Human Rights Watch 1 (G) (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports
98/us-immig/Ins989-05.htm.
2. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684 (2001).
3. See id.
4. See Brief for Respondents at 5, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (No. 997791).
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acquired U.S. citizenship. 5 Zadvydas has an extensive criminal history,
culminating in a 1987 conviction for possessing cocaine with the intent to
distribute. 6 He was sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment, with six
years of the sentence suspended. 7 After serving two years of his sentence,
Zadvydas earned parole. 8 Had Zadvydas been a U.S. citizen, his detention
would likely have ended then. Instead, the Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS) took Zadvydas into custody and began deportation proceedings. 9 In 1994 an immigration judge ordered Zadvydas deported to Germany because he was an alien convicted of two crimes of moral
turpitude. 10 Both Germany and Lithuania refused to take Zadvydas
because he met neither of the countries' citizenship requirements, so the
INS kept Zadvydas in jail. I I In 1996 the INS tried to deport Zadvydas to
the Dominican Republic, his wife's home country.' 2 These negotiations
failed, and the INS kept Zadvydas in jail. 13 For all practical purposes the
14
INS felt justified in keeping Zadvydas detained indefinitely.
Until the Supreme Court ruled on Zadvydas' detention in June of 2001
nearly 3,000 aliens whose crimes ranged from serious felonies to overstaying a tourist visa languished in U.S. prisons with little hope of release,
based on the sheer accident that that no other country would take them.' 5
The INS based these detentions on the statutory authority of Immigration
and Nationality Act § 241(a)(6) which provides:
[a]n alien ordered removed who is inadmissible.., removable [as a result of
violations of status requirements or entry conditions, criminal convictions,
or matters of foreign policy], or who has been determined by the Attorney
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply
with the order
16
of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period."

The government argued that this statute granted the Attorney General the
power to continually detain an alien, perhaps indefinitely, and that the
statute comported with substantive and procedural due process because
the courts owe Congress and the Executive "substantial deference under
the plenary power doctrine," and because periodic administrative review of
the administrative decision to keep an alien jailed could properly evaluate
17
the alien's threat to the community or flight risk.
5. See Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1999).
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. INS brought the deportation proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)
(1998 ed., Supp. V); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 684-85.
10. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 684.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 684-85.
14. See Oral Arguments, Zadvydas v. Underdown, Feb. 12, 2001, 2000 U.S. Trans.
LEXIS 12, at *39.
15. See Convicted Immigrants' Detention Limited, WORLD NEWS DIGEST,June 28, 2001.
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
17. Brief for Respondents at 17-20, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (No. 997791).
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When taken as part of the recent legislative trend insulating administrative immigration decisions from judicial review, 18 the government's
interpretation seemed particularly excessive. 19 The government read this
vague statute as giving the Attorney General wide discretion to hold an
alien potentially for life. 20 The government further asserted that the Attorney General's decisions were largely immune from judicial review. 2 1 In
addition, the government argued that under the plenary power doctrine,
the courts should grant "substantial deference" to immigration decisions
22
the government makes under Congressional authority.
In June 2001, the Supreme Court responded to these events with the
Zadvydas v. Davis opinion. 23 In a 5-4 decision, the Court cited serious
constitutional concerns with an interpretation of the statute that would
allow indefinite detention. 24 However, rather than invalidate the statute,
the majority took a middle ground, reading a limit into the statute whereby
an alien's post-removal-period detention is only allowed for a period reasonably necessary to bring about removal. 25 The Court held that deten26
tion past six months is presumptively invalid.
Although Zadvydas was something of a compromise, the ruling still
bolsters due process protection for some immigrants and signals a
18. See, e.g., Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) §§ 106(a)(10), 242(a)(2)(B)-(C).
Courts understandably disfavor provisions that infringe on their power of review.
Though courts have generally refrained from striking down these court-stripping statutes, they often limit their application. See Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996)
(limiting the scope of INA § 106(a)(10), but declining to find a constitutional violation
because the statute preserves habeas corpus relief); Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147 (9th
Cir. 1997) (applying INA § 242(a)(2)(B)'s ban on review of discretionary decisions
made by the Attorney General to the denial of suspension of deportation, but nonetheless finding some aspects of the Attorney General's decision outside the provision's

scope).
19. This legislative trend could conceivably bolster the government's position that
Congress designed INA § 241(a)(6) to give the Attorney General wide latitude concerning immigration. However, such an interpretation combined with the court-stripping
provisions seems to have been too much of an encroachment on the judicial branch's
power for the Court to bear.
20. See Brief for Respondents at 17-20, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (No.
99-7791).
21. See id.
22. Under the plenary power doctrine, courts largely defer to Congress and the
Executive on immigration matters out of respect for both the highly political and
strongly international nature of regulating immigration. See id. at 17 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) that "any policy toward aliens is
vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of
government" and "such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference").
23. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
24. Id. at 690.
25. Id. at 698-99.
26. Id. at 701. Note, however, that not all the detainees will be released after six
months. Id. The opinion arguably gives the Department of Justice leeway to continue
jailing many of the detainees who, for example, may be part of "a small segment of
particularly dangerous individuals." Id. at 691 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 368 (1997)).
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decreased judicial willingness to tolerate legal fictions that strip immigrants of constitutional protections. The lasting power of the decision,
though, may be its reassertion of judicial review and lessening of the deference accorded to the legislative and executive powers when it comes to
immigration. Nonetheless, the compromise path the majority opinion took
was far from neat. The majority made no clear constitutional decisions.
Nor did the court give clear guidance as to whom the opinion in fact
applies.
This Note argues that Zadvydas is an important assertion of judicial
primacy, but, as to indefinite detentions, much remains to be decided. Part
I of this Note traces the history of indefinitely detaining deportable aliens,
emphasizing the exceptional character of the recent trends in this area.
Part II contrasts the disparate ways in which the circuits have dealt with
indefinite detentions. In Part III, this Note examines the Supreme Court's
ruling in Zadvydas. Part IV outlines the administrative and judicial reactions to some of the ruling's anomalies, paying particular attention to the
vexing problem of deciding which aliens actually benefit from the decision's protections. Finally, this Note concludes that although the Supreme
Court resolved the split among circuits, it failed to definitively resolve some
important immigration questions.
I.

A Brief History Regarding the Detention of Deportable Aliens

Until this past decade, both Congress and U.S. courts generally approved
of the detention of deportable aliens for only the limited time necessarily
28
related to effectuating removal. 27 However, diplomatic miscalculations
and a convergence of xenophobia and get-tough-on-crime attitudes in Congress 2 9 have recently led to statutory limbo. Now, aliens who have served
their criminal debt to U.S. society are nonetheless being held indefinitely
because the government cannot find a country to which to repatriate them.
The Immigration Act of 1917 gave the Secretary of Labor discretion in
deciding to which country an alien could be deported. 30 The Act failed to
27. See, e.g., Castillo-Gradis v. Turnage, 752 F. Supp. 937, 939 (S.D. Cal. 1990)
(stringently enforcing former 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c), which mandated that "the Attorney
General shall have a period of six months from the date of [a final removal order] . .. to
effect the alien's departure from the United States" after which time the alien became
subject to a supervised release program).
28. Much of the legal foundation for indefinite detention grew out of court decisions
and ad hoc measures meant to deal with Mariel Cubans. See Kevin Costello, Comment,
Without a Country: Indefinite Detention as Constitutional Purgatory,3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
503, 507-09 (2001). The Mariel boatlift itself, and the United States' subsequent inability to negotiate the return of Mariel Cubans convicted of crimes, are far from highlights
of American diplomacy.
29. Congress passed the harsh immigration measures contained in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) following the Oklahoma City Bombing,
a horrendous crime but notable in that it was perpetrated by Americans.
30. See Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, § 20, 8 U.S.C. § 156 (repealed 1952).
Under the 1917 Act an alien could be deported "to the country whence they came or to
the foreign port at which such aliens embarked for the United States;" or if they are not
citizens of the country from which they embarked, and that country refuses them entry,
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3
outline how long aliens could be held after a final removal order. ' Federal
courts, therefore, imposed a reasonable time limit on such detentions, typically ordering the release of any deportable alien held longer than four
months. 32 Congress codified the reasonable limitation as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 33 which required the supervised release of any deportable alien whose deportation could not be
effectuated within six months, 3 4 and stringently enforced the limitation

until as recently as 1990.
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However, in 1990 Congress revised the INA to direct the Attorney General to continue to detain deportable aliens who had been convicted of
aggravated felonies, unless the alien had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence and the Attorney General determined the alien was not a
flight risk.3 6 The statute was unique because for the first time it authorized indefinite detention of aliens. Nevertheless, the narrow definition of
"aggravated felony" at the time ensured the measure's limited application.
In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 3 7 The act
fundamentally altered the INA's indefinite detention provisions by affirmatively requiring the Attorney General to take into custody and detain aliens
who had been convicted of aggravated felonies, controlled substances and
firearms offenses, and other serious crimes, upon their release from jail
and pending their removal. Furthermore, the scope of these crimes also
expanded from murder and rape, to crimes punishable by a one-year sentence or more, even if commuted. 38 The 1996 law also applied
39
retroactively.
Congress relented somewhat when, later in 1996, it passed the Illegal
then "to the country in which they resided prior to entering the country from which they
entered the United States." Id.
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53 F. 2d 13, 16 (9th Cir. 1931) (ordering that if
a deportable alien's return to Russia can not be carried out within thirty days the prisoner "be discharged from custody"); United States ex rel. Ross v. Wallis, 279 F. 401,
403-04 (2d Cir. 1922) (finding that any detention of a deportable alien past four
months "under pretense of awaiting opportunity for deportation" amounts to "unlawful
imprisonment" from which habeas relief may be afforded); Elizabeth Larson Beyer, Comment, A Right Or A Privilege: Constitutional Protection For Detained Deportable Aliens
Refused Access or Return To Their Native Countries, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1033

(2000).
33. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Castillo-Gradis v. Turnage, 752 F. Supp. 937, 940 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (noting that the six month requirement may only be circumvented where actions on the part
of the deportable alien actually cause the delay in his deportation); Dor v. District Director, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1989).
36. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 504(a), 104
Stat. 5049 (amended 1996) (former 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) & (B) (1991)).
37. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
38. Id.
39. id.
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Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 40
The statute restored some discretion to the Attorney General to grant relief
from detention. 4 1 However, under the statute, inadmissible aliens who are
ordered removed, criminal aliens, aliens who have violated their non-immigrant status conditions, aliens removable for certain national security or
foreign relations reasons, and any alien who has been determined by the
Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with
the order of removal, must be held by the INS during removal proceedings2
4
and for ninety days thereafter, during which time removal should occur.
If the removal does not occur within ninety days, the Attorney General can
continue to detain an alien who is "a risk to the community or unlikely to
comply with the order of removal." 4 3 The act does not address how long
the Attorney General can actually hold these aliens, saying only that these
and, if released, shall
aliens "may be detained beyond the removal period
' 44
be subject to icertain] terms of supervision.
Administrative regulations implementing the statute allow the INS District Director to make discretionary release decisions based on several factors. 4 5 For example, under the regulations the alien must prove "by clear
and convincing evidence that the release would not pose a danger to the
community or a significant flight risk."'46 Furthermore, the INS created
interim procedures for "aliens whose immediate repatriation is not possible or practicable." 4 7 These procedures call for automatic administrative
review of post-final order detention cases both before and after the statutory ninety day removal period, and a mandatory review every six
48
months.

40. Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, §§ 303-09, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
41. Id.
42. See INA § 236(c) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)); § 241(a)(2) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)).
43. Id. § 241(a)(6) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)).
44. Id.
45. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(c)(1), (h), (k)(1)(i) (2001). The non-exhaustive nine factors are:
(1) The nature and seriousness of the alien's criminal convictions; (2) Other
criminal history; (3) Sentence(s) imposed and time actually served; (4) History
of failures to appear for court (defaults); (5) Probation history; (6) Disciplinary
problems while incarcerated; (7) Evidence of rehabilitative effort or recidivism;
(8) Equities in the United States; and (9) Prior immigration violations and
history.
Id. § 241.4(a)(1)-(9).
46. Id.
47. Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson, Executive Associate Commissioner,
Office of Field Operations, INS, United States Department of Justice, on Detention Procedures for Aliens Whose Immediate Repatriation is Not Possible or Practicable (Feb. 3,
1999).
48. Id.

2003
I.

Zadvydas v. Davis Reins in Indefinite Detentions

Disagreement among Circuits

A. The Ninth Circuit Approach
In 1990, a panel of five Western District of Washington judges consolidated and considered over 100 habeas corpus claims 4 9 filed by detained
lawful permanent residents. 50 The petitioners in Phan v. Reno51 challenged the constitutionality of their continued detention on both substantive and procedural due process grounds. Although the Ninth Circuit 52 and
Supreme Court 5 3 affirmed the ruling on different grounds, the district
judges' decision deserves considerable attention because its treatment of
petitioners' constitutional claims portends how courts would treat the
issues were a new law or implementing regulation to drive the constitu54
tional issues back into consideration.
The district court held post-removal-period detention unconstitutional
unless "there is a realistic chance that [the] alien will be deported. ' 55 The
court rejected the government's "legal fiction" argument that aliens forfeit
Fifth Amendment protections because, once ordered deported, they "assimilate" to an excludable status akin to an alien arriving at the border. 56 The
panel ruled that the petitioners were "all long-time permanent legal
residents of the United States and, as such, are 'persons' entitled to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment, despite having been ordered
'57
deported."
Regarding the substantive due process claim, the judges ruled that the
government had to overcome strict scrutiny to infringe upon the petitioners' fundamental liberty interest in being free from incarceration. 58
According to the court, INS detention is only justified in detaining an alien
to effectuate that alien's deportation. Furthermore, continued detention is
"excessive" where there is no realistic chance deportation will actually
occur. 59

60
And, the court did not grant the usual judicial deference

accorded the legislative and executive branches on immigration matters.
Instead, the court characterized the detention scheme as "involving domes61
tic interests rather than international concerns."
49. The court acted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
50. See Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
51. Id.
52. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
53. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
54. See Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149.
55. Id. at 1156.
56. Id. at 1154. The government argued that once it lodges a final deportation order
against a resident alien he has no due process guarantees; such an alien stands on equal
Constitutional footing as the alien in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953), who had not legally entered the United States. Id. at 1153-54 (discussing
application of the "entry fiction").
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1154-55.
59. Id. at 1156.
60. For a brief explanation of the Plenary Power doctrine, see discussion supra note
22.
61. Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
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Turning to the procedural due process issues common to all the petitioners, the court balanced the petitioners' fundamental right to freedom
against the government's procedural safeguards. 62 The court chided the
INS for depriving the petitioners of meaningful and impartial review, and
even hinted that institutional bias on the part of the INS might per se preclude the agency from impartiality. 6 3 The judges found that the absence of
any individualized assessment of the aliens' situation violated their due
process rights, and that "at a minimum, each petitioner is entitled to a fair
and impartial hearing before an immigration judge," and a right of appeal
64
to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
A district court judge applied the general constitutional framework
from Phan to one of the resident aliens whose case had been consolidated,
and ordered him released. 6 5 The INS appealed the ruling, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. The appellate court largely
avoided the constitutional questions by holding that the INS lacked the
statutory authority to detain a resident alien for more than a reasonable
66
time past the ninety day removal period.
The Ninth Circuit chose to read the reasonable limitation into the statute because such a reading allowed the court to avoid deciding the due
process issues, is more reasonable than allowance of indefinite detentions
in light of the history of detention statutes, and best comports with international law. 6 7 The court relied heavily upon the constitutional avoidance
rule, under which courts avoid deciding substantial constitutional issues if
a statute can be interpreted in a way that avoids the constitutional questions. 6 8 By invoking this doctrine, the court arguably conceded that the
statute had substantial constitutional problems, but nevertheless devoted
little discussion to the district court's legal findings. Given the opinion's
tone, though, it seems possible that, had the court not delayed the constitutional issues by relying on statutory interpretation, it may have affirmed
69
the district court's constitutional approach.
The Ninth Circuit did, however, reiterate that, contrary to the government's contention, the resident aliens in this case deserve Fifth Amendment protections. 70 The court distinguished the lessened constitutional
62. Id. at 1156; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (balancing "the interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
interest through the procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current
procedures").
63. See Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1157.
64. Id.
65. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
66. Id. at 818.
67. Id. at 822.
68. Id.; see DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916).
69. The court, for example, framed the issue as whether "the Attorney General has
the legal authority to hold Ma, who is now twenty-two, in detention indefinitely, perhaps
for the remainder of his life." Ma, 208 F.3d at 818.
70. Id. at 825.
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protections afforded aliens in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei 7 '
and Barrera-Echavarriav. Rison 72 by noting that the aliens in both of those
cases were excludable aliens who, for legal purposes, were treated as if they
had not entered the United States. 73 But the court stressed that in general
"aliens who have entered the United States, legally or illegally, are entitled
to the protections of the Fifth Amendment." 74 While the court acknowledged the government's essentially unfettered power to exclude aliens, it
nonetheless refused to grant the government the same discretion to deport
aliens from within the United States. Finally, the court did not grant the
executive and legislative branches the usual "plenary power" 75 deference
accorded them on immigration matters.
B.

76

The Fifth Circuit Approach

In February of 1997 Kestutis Zadvydas applied to the district court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana for habeas relief.7 7 A magistrate judge recommended denying the petition, arguing simply that the detention was
authorized by statute, and that the Attorney General did not abuse her discretion. 78 The district court overruled that recommendation on Fifth
Amendment substantive due process grounds, arguing that indefinite
79
detention is unduly excessive in relation to the government's goals.
A considerable portion of the district court's opinion was devoted to
countering the government's argument that § 306 of IIRIRA deprives
courts of jurisdiction to review any claims stemming from a deportation
order. 80 The court traced the history of habeas relief, ultimately deciding
that IIRIRA did not repeal habeas relief, absent specific language to that
effect. 8 1 The court also opined that if IIRIRA were meant to deny habeas
83
82
Ultirelief, it might violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.
mately the court decided that habeas is preserved because the case con71. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
72. Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995).
73. See Ma, 208 F.3d at 825-26.
74. Id. at 825.
75. See discussion supra note 22.
76. Id. at 826-27 (ruling that the "plenary power doctrine does not apply in the
same way to each case to which it is relevant, and that its exercise is subject to constitutional restraints"); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983).
77. See Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (E.D. La. 1997).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1023-27.
80. The INA states:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf
of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
Alien under [the Immigration and Nationality Act].
INA § 242(g) (codified at 8 U.S. C. § 1252(g)).
81. See Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. at 1017-19.
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The Suspension Clause reads: "The privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety many require it." Id.
83. Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. at 1019.
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cerned "grave constitutional error or a fundamental miscarriage of
84
justice."
The district court ruled that former 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) 8 5 could
be invalid in so far as the government is able to employ the statute to go
beyond permissible substantive due process limits. 8 6 According to the

court, the statute's constitutionality depends on whether detention is
excessive in relation to the statute's goals of protecting the community
from aggravated felons and preventing flight-both of which the court held
are legitimate state goals. 8 7 But the statute's primary justification, argued
the court, is effectuating deportation.8 8 When deportation is no longer
possible, detention loses its rationale: "[P]etitioner's detention of nearly
four years with no end in sight, and the probability of permanent confinement, is an excessive means of accomplishing the purposes sought to be
served." 89 The detention was so excessive that it "'shocks the conscience'
of the court."90
The INS appealed and the Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that
Zadvydas deserved less constitutional protections than accorded him by
the district court. 91 In a bow to the government's legal fictions, the Fifth
Circuit relied heavily upon Gisbert9 2 and Mezei. 9 3 The Fifth Amendment
does not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, but instead reads
that "No person ... shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' 9 4 Nonetheless, the Gisbert court ruled that the
government could circumvent the Fifth Amendment by reasoning that
Muriel Cubans who were detained at the borders and then conditionally
admitted into the country under an ad hoc "parole" scheme were legally
95
still at the borders, though physically within the United States.
The Fifth Circuit recognized that resident aliens possess some rights
as people within the United States. 96 Nevertheless, the court did not
describe or enforce those rights. Instead, the Fifth Circuit here carried the
entry fiction one step further by reasoning that once a legally admitted
resident alien who is still in the United States is ordered deported, he
deserves only the minimal constitutional protection extended to an alien
84. Id.
85. At the time of the suit, the INS was jailing Zadvydas pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(A) - (B); subsequent courts considered the constitutionality of Zadvydas'
continued detention under the superseding statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
86. See Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. at 1011.
87. Id. at 1026.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1027.
90. Id.
91. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
92. Gisbert v. Att'y Gen., 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993).
93. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Zadvydas v.
Underdown, 185 F.3d at 285.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
95. See Gisbert, 988 F.2d 1437. This is commonly known as the "entry fiction." Id.
at 1440.
96.

Id. at 1442 (stating "excludable aliens are entitled to those due process rights as

are provided by law").
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seeking admission at the borders. 9 7 Having cast the aliens' substantive due
process rights as minimal, the court balanced those rights against the government's interest in effectuating a resident alien's departure. 98 Finally,
the court ruled that "Zadvydas' detention is within the core area of the
government's plenary immigration power, and thus does not violate substantive due process." 9 9
The Fifth Circuit's ultimate holding was not too far out of step with
that of the Ninth Circuit: "The government may detain a resident alien
based on either danger to the community or risk of flight while good faith
efforts to effectuate the alien's deportation continue and reasonable parole
and periodic review procedures are in place."' 0 0 Nonetheless, the reasoning Fifth Circuit took to reach that conclusion embraced legal fictions,
effectively drained aliens of much of their constitutional rights, willingly
accepted the plenary power doctrine, and forewent meaningful judicial
review.
III.

The Supreme Court Decision

Zadvydas v. Davis' 0 ' teeters on the brink of importance. The Supreme
Court largely favored the Ninth Circuit's reasoning over that of the Fifth
Circuit. 10

2

The Supreme Court reasserted judicial review; it lessened the

plenary deference accorded to the legislative and executive powers when it
comes to immigration; and it upheld important due process protections for
some aliens. However, because the opinion is largely a compromise, the
Court made few definitive constitutional decisions on indefinite detentions, and left important areas unsettled and important questions
unanswered.
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court took the politically agile
textual analysis path; the court framed the issue as whether 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6) authorizes the Attorney General to detain a removable alien
"indefinitely beyond the removal period or only for a period reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal."1 ° 3 Though the Ninth Circuit opined
in Ma that it could have applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,
the court ultimately anchored its decision on the "ordinary tenets of statutory construction."'1 0 4 But the Supreme Court put all its weight behind the
avoidance doctrine. According to the doctrine, when a court has serious
97. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d at 288-90. Such an interpretation is not only
facially a fiction, but it is also a dangerous affront to liberty. The government essentially
argued that it can abrogate constitutional measures designed to protect people during
government proceedings based on the findings of that very infirm proceeding.
98. Id. at 295-97.
99. Id. at 294.
100. Id. at 297; cf. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
101. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
102. On remand, the Ninth Circuit said as much: "In Zadvydas, the Court essentially
Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095,
adopted the reasoning set forth in our opinion.
1098 (9th Cir. 2001).
103. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 682 (emphasis in original).
104. Ma, 208 F.3d at 830.
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doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute the court will chose a reasona05
ble construction of the statute that avoids the constitutional infirmity.'
Although the Court made no explicit constitutional rulings, the avoidance
approach necessitated a thorough constitutional analysis that will likely
inform both future rulings on INS detention procedures and immigration
law generally.
Because the statute as interpreted by the INS would raise "serious constitutional concerns," the Court read an "implicit limitation" into the detention authorization. '0 6 The Court ruled that the "statute, read in light of the
Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to
a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the
United States. It does not permit indefinite detention."'10 7 Having decided
that the statute is ambiguous, the Court concluded that once "removal is
no longer reasonably foreseeable," continued detention can no longer be
authorized by the statute.108

A.

Renewed Judicial Oversight

Zadvydas signals new rigor in judicial oversight of both immigration legislation and administrative decisions. Given the government's original argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1252109 deprived the courts of jurisdiction,' 10 it is
perhaps noteworthy that Zadvydas was even heard. The Supreme Court
based its jurisdiction on the habeas provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241."'1
The Court reasoned that whether a given detention is reasonably necessary
to bring about removal bears on whether that detention is pursuant to statutory authority. 112 If a given detention is not reasonably necessary, then it
is not authorized by statute, and habeas relief is warranted. 1 13 Courts
ought not, as the government suggested, simply "accept the Government's
view" about whether a particular incarceration is statutorily authorized,
14
but must conduct an "independent" judicial review.
The court also made significant inroads on the court stripping provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1252.115 The government had argued during the cases'
initial stages that this court-stripping statute immunized discretionary
Attorney General decisions, such as whether and for how long to detain
105. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 689; United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
U.S. 64, 78 (1994); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); United States v. Jin Fuey
Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916).
106. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 689.

107. Id.
108. Id. at 699.
109. "[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review" decisions "specified... to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General." INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)).
110. See Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1015-19 (E.D. La. 1997).
111. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 687.
112. Id. at 699-700.
113. See id. at 699.
114. Id. at 688.
115. Id. at 686-88.
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aliens, from judicial review. 1 16 The government later abandoned this concededly far-reaching rationale,' 17 but the Supreme Court nonetheless isolated 8 U.S.C. § 1252.118 The Court reasoned that the petitioners were not
challenging the Attorney General's actual decision but the constitutional
extent of the Attorney General's authority. 119 This test seems to preserve
most constitutional challenges to administrative decisions, since these
challenges question the constitutional validity of the scheme under which
the Attorney General makes his or her decision, not the decision itself.
And many challenges previously framed as error could possibly be remade
into substantive or procedural due process claims. If the Attorney General
makes a discretionary decision in an arbitrary way, the decision might be
reviewable because it would exceed the Attorney General's authority under
the Constitution, and consequently under any statute. If the Attorney General makes a discretionary ruling implicating a fundamental right that is
clearly in error, the statutory scheme that allowed such a ruling is open to
attack as containing procedural due process shortfalls.
The Court also alluded to separation of powers concerns should court
stripping be carried too far. 120 The Court cited a case 12 1 for the proposition that the Constitution may forbid giving "an administrative body the
unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental
rights."' 122 The "fundamental right" presumably implicated is the alien's
liberty interest. Although the Court centered its avoidance rationale
around this interest, the court never clearly delineated the scope of this
fundamental liberty interest.' 23 So, like much of the opinion, the true
weight of this language will only be understood through future case law.
Furthermore, the Zadvydas Court reasserted the power of judicial
review by cutting into the plenary power doctrine.t 2 4 The government had
relied heavily on that doctrine, arguing that the judicial branch must defer
to the executive and legislative branches on immigration issues because of
the political and international character of immigration.' 25 After noting
that the doctrine is "subject to important constitutional limitations," the
116. See Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1016 (E.D. La. 1997) (stating the
government's position that "because of Section 12 52(g) [it] contends that... this Court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's claims").
117. See Brief for Respondents at 93, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (No. 99-

7791).
118.

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 688.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 688-89.
121. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 (1985).
122. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 692 (citing Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at
Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 (1985)).
123. See id. at 696 (holding that "an alien's liberty interest is, at the least, strong
enough to raise a serious [constitutional] question(s)").
124. Id. at 695-96.
125. Id.; see Brief for Respondents at 19, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (No.
99-7791) (arguing that the Attorney General's decision to detain an alien under a final
deportation order be accorded "substantial deference").
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Court attacked the intellectual underpinnings of the doctrine.1 2 6 The
majority noted that judicial deference on immigration issues is rooted in
the idea that foreign policy concerns are better left to the expertise of the
other two governmental branches. 127 The Court reasoned that only those
immigration decisions tightly connected to foreign policy concerns, then,
ought to be accorded deference: "The sole foreign policy considerations the
Government mentions here is the concern lest courts interfere with 'sensitive' repatriation negotiations ... But neither the Government nor the dissents explain how a habeas court's efforts to determine the likelihood of
repatriation, if handled with appropriate sensitivity, could make a significant difference in this respect." 128 This side-step past the plenary power
doctrine could have wide ramifications throughout immigration law.
The Zadvydas Court did not accept the government's strong argument
that the Attorney General's decision involved foreign policy concerns. 129
Instead, the Court made a scrutinizing judicial inquiry that narrowly
focused on the act of incarceration rather than the larger international
scheme of which incarceration was simply a part. The manner by which
aliens are deported is far more connected to the sovereignty of the nation
and foreign policy issues than the welfare benefits scheme that the court invoking the plenary powers doctrine - chose to exempt from judicial scrutiny in Diaz.130 In Zadvydas the government was not regulating benefits
aliens receive while in the country, but more the process by which aliens
are extracted from the country. ' 3 ' That process was closely tied to negotiations with foreign powers. 1 32 In fact, the Court's ultimate ruling, according
to Justice Kennedy's dissent, "would require the Executive Branch to surrender its primacy in foreign affairs and submit reports to the courts
respecting ongoing negotiations in the international sphere.' 3 3 Clearly,
the Zadvydas decision has eroded the plenary power doctrine. The government must now make a strong showing of how foreign policy is implicated
before the courts can rely on the plenary power doctrine.
Finally, Zadvydas' practical holding is emblematic of the Court's
favorable attitude toward judicial oversight. The test the Court created to
126. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 695-96; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
941-43 (1983) (discussing Plenary Power doctrine).
127. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 695-96.
128. Id. at 696 (citations omitted).
129. The actual repatriation of aliens, and the negotiation of repatriation treaties,
both of which are central to the detention of these aliens, are particularly tied to the
foreign relations power of the executive. Id.
130. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). In Mathews, the Court invoked the plenary power doctrine in declining to interfere with a medical insurance program that
required an alien to be a resident for five years before he or she could collect government
benefits. Id. at 81-84. Any connection that welfare scheme had with foreign relations
was arguably quite attenuated. Although the benefits that the United States gives to
aliens perhaps influences to what extent those from abroad will want to move to the
United States, the same, or perhaps a stronger, argument could be made about indefinite
detentions.
131. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 695-96.
132. See id. at 725. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133. Id.

2003

Zadvydas v. Davis Reins in Indefinite Detentions

judge whether a particular detention is statutorily authorized hinges on a
judicial inquiry into the likelihood of repatriation. 1 3 4 The Court did not
simply defer to the government's views on a given repatriation. 13 5 Nor did
the Court endorse the Fifth Circuit's holding, which put the onus on the
alien to prove that repatriation is "impossible."' 13 6 For the sake of historical consistency and administrative ease, the Court allowed six months of
presumptively reasonable jailing. 13 7 After six months, though, if an alien
provides "good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government must respond
with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing."' 13 8 The majority not only
refused to defer to the executive branch on the constitutionality of the
detention scheme, it also asserted its power of judicial review over the
quintessentially executive branch function of determining the likelihood of
repatriation. '

39

The Court has squarely inserted itself into the realm of indefinite
detentions. The courts are a long way from the government's initial argument that the judiciary could not even consider Zadvydas' claim.
B. Greater Due Process Protections for Some Aliens
The Supreme Court in Zadvydas ruled that detentions of aliens beyond a
period reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal "would raise serious constitutional concerns.' 140 But because the Court read 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6) as allowing only for reasonable detentions, the Court made
no explicit constitutional findings. Nonetheless, the majority opinion
shows a commitment to strengthening substantive and procedural due process for resident aliens, perhaps even to the level accorded citizens.
The Court seemed to repudiate the line of cases upon which the Fifth
Circuit relied, and boosted the general constitutional protection afforded
resident aliens. The government had argued that Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei' 4 t sanctioned lessened constitutional protection for
unadmitted aliens, particularly in the area of detention.' 42 In the Korean
War era case of Mezei, the Court rejected the constitutional claims of an
134. Id. at 701 (holding that "an alien may be held in confinement until it has been
determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future").
135. id.
136. Id. at 702; see Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir. 1999).
137. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 701.
138. Id.
139. See id. Justice Kennedy sensed the import of this judicial oversight in his dissent. He would have rather concentrated the judicial inquiry on whether there were
adequate procedural safeguards in place to determine an alien's dangerousness. Id. at
724-25 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that "the Court's rule is a
serious misconception of the proper judicial function" because "[h]igh officials of the
Department of State could be called on to testify" about repatriation negotiations. id. at
725 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 682.
141. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
142. See Brief for Respondents at 35, Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001) (No.

99-7791).
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alien who had left the United States and was seeking readmission at Ellis
Island. 143 The government has since relied on Mezei and its progeny to
justify lessened constitutional protections for those aliens "paroled" into
the United States. Parole is a legal fiction whereby the government allows
an alien physical entry into the United States, but for constitutional and
44
legal purposes treats the alien as still being at the border seeking entry.1
The government started this questionable practice to, on a case by case
basis, ease the burdens of the processing procedure. The government has
subsequently invoked the doctrine to admit large numbers of aliens into
the United States, while simultaneously denying those aliens the constitutional protections they would have enjoyed under normal immigration procedures. 14 5 Preceding Zadvydas, the government added to this admittedly
odd legal fiction by further arguing that aliens who had been properly
admitted and who lost their status while still in the United States were the
legal equivalent of aliens seeking admission at the border, and thus did not
14 6
deserve constitutional protection.
The Supreme Court refused to accept this double entry fiction.' 4 7 The
majority ruled that "once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstances change, for the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within
the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent."'1 48 In a significant move the Court
isolated Mezei to its facts, ruling that Mezei's "extended departure"
required him to seek admission again, and that his "presence on Ellis
Island" did not count as entry into the United States. 149 He did not
deserve the full extent of Fifth Amendment protections because he was at
143. See Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. 206.
144. Parole started as a practice whereby aliens were conditionally allowed into the
country, pending a decision on their admissibility. For legal purposes the aliens were
treated as if at the border, and remained subject to exclusion hearings. This practical
necessity was codified in 1952 at INA § 212(d)(5), which allowed the Attorney General
to parole into the country aliens "temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." Though
parole was originally designed to deal with the practical necessities of processing immigrants, the Attorney General has used his flexible parole power to conditionally admit
large numbers of refugees from such countries as Hungary, Indochina, and Cuba. As
parolees have not technically been admitted into the United States, their legal status is
the subject of considerable debate. See generally ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY

the history of parole, see

507-10 (4th ed. 1998). For a discussion of

CHARLES GORDON,

STANLEY MAILMAN,

&

STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR,

§ 62 (2002).
145. GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 144.
146. Id.; see also Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1058-59 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding
that after a final deportation order alien has no greater right to be released into the
United States than an alien seeking admission at the border).
147. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692-93 (2001). The fiction is double insomuch as the government not only argued that aliens paroled into the United States were
not in the United States for legal purposes, but that those who gained admission legally
could then be stripped of any protections they supposedly had and treated as if they too
were paroled into the United States. Id.
148. Id. at 693; see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 77 (1976).
149. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 693.
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
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the border seeking admission. 15 0 So, even though ordered deported, aliens
such as Zadvydas, who are physically present in the United States are still
"people" under the authority of the United States, and thus deserving of
Fifth Amendment protections. In a perfunctory nod to the precedents
upon which the government relied, 15 1 the majority did acknowledge that
"the nature of that protection may vary depending on status and
52
circumstances."'
Nonetheless, the Court's equivocating treatment of the entry fiction
and its failure to explicitly overrule Mezei has created a great deal of judi15 3
cial confusion about whether parolees also deserve due process rights.
InJanuary 2001 the Sixth Circuit had essentially relegated Mezei to its historical era. 15 4 In Rosales-Garciav. Holland the Sixth Circuit reasoned that
the lessened protections of Mezei was a relic of judicial deference to
national security during the Korean War and declined to uphold the case's
present application.15 5 But after the Supreme Court's ruling in Zadvydas
the Sixth Circuit reconsidered its stance, ruling that Zadvydas preserved
much of Mezei. 15 6 Other courts have also embraced this rationale 1 57 -that
in declining to extend Mezei's lessened protections to resident aliens
deemed removable, the Supreme Court implicitly affirmed Mezei's applica158
tion to paroled aliens.
Having ruled that the resident aliens at issue deserve Fifth Amendment protection, the Court found serious substantive due process concerns with an interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) that would allow
indefinite detentions.1 59 The majority framed the substantive due process
question quite liberally, noting that "freedom from imprisonment ... lies
at the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process] Clause protects."' 160 The
Court acknowledged that detention may be ordered as part of criminal proceedings with adequate procedural protections, and in special, narrow circumstances such as where dangerous mental illness outweighs liberty
concerns.'61 But immigration detention is civil and non-punitive.' 6 2 The
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. (noting that his status as an excludable alien "made all the difference").
See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 694.
For a discussion of parole, see discussion supra note 144.
See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 719-21.
See Carballo v. Luttrell, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21695 at *40-43 (6th Cir. Oct. 11,

2001).

157. See, e.g., Vera v. Estrada, No. 3-01-CV-1044-X, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17790
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2001); Fernandez-Fajardo v. INS, 193 F. Supp. 2d 877 (M.D. La.
2001). For a discussion of parole, see supra note 144.
158. For a detailed discussion of why such a reading is unwarranted, see infra Section
V.
159. Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678, 690-93 (2001).
160. Id. at 690.
161. Id. 690-91.
162. Id. A claim could be made that the detentions are in fact punitive. Among the
factors that the INS can consider in deciding whether to continue to jail an alien are "the
nature and seriousness of the alien's criminal convictions. .. other criminal history ...
sentence(s) imposed and time actually served . . . evidence of rehabilitative effort or
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court dismissed the government's two purported 163 reasons for detention
as not "sufficiently strong" enough to justify an indefinite infringement on
an alien's liberty interest.' 6 4 First, the justification of preventing flight "is
65
weak or non-existent where removal seems a remote possibility at best."'
Second, protecting the community would only suffice when applied to particularly dangerous criminals who have been afforded strict procedural
safeguards.' 6 6 The government's interpretation of the statute was far too
broad; under its reading the statute would apply equally to those whose
chance of removal ranges from forthcoming to impossible, and to those
67
whose dangerousness ranges from severe to minimal.1
While the Court's substantive due process analysis might have wide
application, 168 the Court's procedural due process analysis seems limited.
Because it relied on the avoidance doctrine, the Court never truly ruled on
the constitutionality of the procedural scheme the INS uses to decide who
is to be detained and for how long. Also, the Court largely rested its constitutional analysis on substantive due process grounds: "We believe that an
alien's liberty interest is, at the very least, strong enough to raise a serious
question as to whether, irrespective of the procedures used, the Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and potentially permanent."' 169
The majority opinion was particularly concerned, though, that the "sole
procedural protections" are part of "administrative hearings" where the
alien bears the burden of proving he is not dangerous, without later "serious" judicial review. 170 It follows, then, that a procedure that puts the
burden of proof on the government and more intimately involves the judicirecidivism." 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a)(1)-(9). Essentially, those whose crimes were serious,
those who were not punished enough, and those who have not been rehabilitated ought
to remain in jail. Such considerations seem dangerously close to punishment. Double
jeopardy and equal protection claims might flow from such a finding, as the government
is punishing these aliens twice for one crime, and the government is targeting only
aliens for this harsh treatment. A finding that these detentions are punishment might
also involve a separation of powers analysis, as the executive is taking on a largely judicial function in determining whom to punish.
163. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 690-91.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 690.
166. Id. at 691.
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., Sorbo v. Reno, No. 98 CV 6154, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17497 at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2001) (relying on Zadvydas for the general proposition that "arbitrary
detention of aliens for lengthy periods may violate the constitution," and releasing a
resident alien pending a discretionary deportation relief hearing).
169. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 696 (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 700. Administrative regulations allowed for administrative review of postfinal order detentions cases every six months, where the INS District director would
determine "whether there has been a change in circumstances that would support a
release decision." Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson, supra note 47. Under the
interim procedure, an alien could only appeal a District Director's decision to the Board
of Immigration Appeals if the alien had initiated the detention review by written or oral
request. Otherwise, there was no review and an alien's continued detention was at the
Attorney General's discretion. Id.
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ary would presumably be more in line with procedural due process
requirements.
C.

The Dissenting Opinions

Justice Scalia wrote a short dissent with which Justice Thomas concurred. 17 1 Justice Scalia framed the asserted right as narrowly as possi72
ble-"a constitutional right of supervised release into the United States."'
According to Justice Scalia the case was not about whether the government
can jail a person indefinitely, for he largely presumed the government has
such power.1 73 Rather, Justice Scalia asked whether there exists "a right of
release into this country by an individual who concededly has no legal right
to be here."' 174 The implications of such a constitutional contortion are
frightening because his analysis shifted the intellectual burden of persuasion by implicitly assuming that an individual seeking constitutional protection point to a specific clause protecting the specific conduct in which
he wants to engage. 17 5 Because most fundamental rights are not so particularly described, such a reading would cut short many important constitutional protections.
Justice Scalia accepted the government's double entry fiction, reasoning that aliens ordered deported "stand on equal footing with an inadmissible alien at the threshold of entry."' 76 Because aliens who are not in fact in
the United States have no right of entry into the United States, he reasoned
that aliens ordered deported also have no right of "release into the country."' 77 This rationale guts the Fifth Amendment of much of its meaning.
The Fifth Amendment clearly accords all "people" due process protection. 178 Why would the Fifth Amendment accord rights to people rather
than citizens if the government could simply trample on the rights of noncitizens by first ordering them deported?
Justice Kennedy wrote a more nuanced dissent with which Justices
Rehnquist, Thomas and Scalia joined. 179 Justice Kennedy was most concerned with the majority's statutory construction and the difficulties that
171. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 702-05.
172. Id. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note, however, that the aliens at issue are in
fact inside the United States.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 703 (emphasis in original).
175. Justice Scalia has used this tactic in other cases as well. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (narrowing the definition of the right to privacy in
finding no "fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy").
176. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. Id. Justice Scalia admitted that the United States probably can not torture deportable aliens. See id. But he does not really explain why the protection afforded deportable aliens ought to lie somewhere between jailing and torture. Furthermore, Justice
Scalia's analysis could easily be carried to extremes, allowing for jailing anyone not
legally admitted to the United States. See id.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be . .. deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law").
179. Justices Thomas and Scalia only joined in Part I of Kennedy's dissent. Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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may accompany the Court's plan to review detentions.180 Justice Kennedy
argued that the statute is "straightforward," and not susceptible to two
meanings, so constitutional avoidance ought not play a part in the analysis.18 1 Further, he argued that the reasonable limitations the majority read
into 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) would defeat the statutory purpose of protecting
the community; the most dangerous criminals might be released first
under the majority's test because they would be the most difficult to repatriate. 18 2 Kennedy argued that the majority's test places too much emphasis on the likelihood of repatriation, and not enough on the danger the
alien poses to the community or his flight risk.' 8 3 Further, Justice Kennedy was concerned that the majority's test would disrupt the balance of
powers: the test would give "to the Judicial Branch the power to summon
high officers of the Executive to assess their progress in conducting some of
the Nation's most sensitive negotiations with foreign powers ....,,184
IV. Remaining Questions
Zadvydas may symbolize a weakening of the plenary power doctrine and a
bolstering of due process protections for some aliens. However, the opinion was not particularly clear-cut. As a matter of statutory construction,
the majority's test is admittedly peculiar. The manner in which the test will
operate in practice remains to be seen. The statutory construction angle
required that much be left vague. The administration and the lower courts
will likely struggle with the opinion's import. The crucial question of
exactly what class of immigrants falls under the ruling, for instance, is still
unclear. And the ultimate question-whether indefinite detentions are constitutional-remains unanswered.
A. Is Zadvydas Workable?
The Supreme Court's statutory construction approach necessarily created
an odd standard by which to judge whether continued detention comports
with the Constitution. Justice Kennedy's dissent was concerned that as a
practical matter, release will now depend not so much on the danger to the
community posed by the alien but on the likelihood of repatriation.18 5 As
a matter of statutory construction, this is an important critique. The
majority's implied reasonability test creates an anomaly in which the most
dangerous, and hence most difficult to repatriate, criminals move to the
front of the release line. Such a result is not easily ascribed to Congress.
However, reading the likelihood of repatriation out of the statute, as
Justice Kennedy might have us do, would create other grave Constitutional
concerns. A statute that fails to consider the likelihood of repatriation
would bear little relation to its objective. Absent a likelihood of repatria180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 705-06.
at 706.
at 709.
at 710.
at 705.
at 709.
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tion, the statute and implementing scheme would place most of its weight
on an alien's dangerousness to the community and such a scheme would
neither involve foreign policy concerns, nor would it deserve the full protection of the plenary power doctrine.' 8 6 Thus, the due process concerns
the majority attached to the present scheme would only be amplified.
Furthermore, double jeopardy' 8 7 and equal protection' 88 problems
might also arise under such a dangerousness focused test. As the likelihood of repatriation figures less prominently in a detention determination,
incarceration seems less like a necessary byproduct of an immigration procedure and more like punishment.t 8 9 When the administration decides
whom to jail based only on such factors as "the nature and seriousness of
the alien's criminal convictions," "other criminal history," "sentence(s)
imposed and time actually served," and "evidence of rehabilitative effort or
recidivism,"i90 it is largely replicating the original criminal court proceedings and imposing its own second sentence. Further, the government is
targeting aliens and not citizens for this harsh treatment of double sentencing. While Zadvydas did not address this argument, the Justices certainly
played with the possibility in oral argument, expressing concern that the
government may be trying to "take one category of people who commit the
same offense and subject them to harsher punishment than another
class."191

In his dissent, Justice Kennedy found separation of powers problems
with a test that involved the likelihood of repatriation, calling judicial
review of such a test "unprecedented, unfortunate, and unwise." 1 92 But an
administrative inquiry that does not center on repatriation would also
skew the proper separation of powers. Justice Kennedy labeled "concepts
93
of flight risk or future dangerousness" as "manageable legal categories."'
He was right. Imposing punishment based on such factors as the seriousness of the offense and the dangerousness to the community is a prototypically judicial function. Not only should the executive not be able to
perform this essentially judicial task, but the executive should not be
allowed to unilaterally second-guess judicial sentences on those whom it
sees fit.
186. The government's sole foreign policy objection to judicial review of administrative rulings under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) was that the judiciary might interfere with "sensitive" repatriation treaties. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001); Brief for
Respondents at 21, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (No. 99-7791). Therefore, a ruling
on an alien's dangerousness would have practically no foreign policy implications.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
188. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
189. See Gisbert v. Att'y Gen., 988 F. 2d 1437, 1442 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that
detention pending exclusion not illegal punishment because it could be seen as a necessary byproduct of the process of expelling an alien).
190. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(o.
191. Oral Arguments, Zadvydas v. Underdown, Feb. 12, 2001, U.S. Trans LEXIS 12.
192. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S 678, 718 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 725.
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Likewise, if the likelihood of repatriation is to be a factor, the dissent94
ers would have had the courts simply accept the government's findings. 1
But to defer to the prosecutor and the jailor concerning the rationale for
keeping a prisoner jailed is not befitting a court, nor a government centered around the idea of checks and balances.
B. The Administrative Reaction
Predictably, the Bush administration will read Zadvydas quite narrowly. A
memorandum issued on July 19, 2001 by Attorney General John Ashcroft
interprets the case only as applying to aliens "who have been admitted into
the United States."'

195

Attorney General Ashcroft said that the Department of Justice intends
19 6
to obey any forthcoming court orders based on the Zadvydas decision.
But he cautioned that the department will attempt to invoke other grounds
for continuing to hold many of the aliens. 1 97 First, the Department of Justice will try to establish bona fide reasons for continuing to hold these
aliens, either by finding state or local criminal sentences that they have not
yet served or by bringing additional criminal charges against them. 198
Additionally, the Department of Justice is working to develop procedures to
continue to hold aliens whose detention is justified by what the Court
called "special circumstances," such as terrorists and "especially dangerous criminals." 1 99 The INS is developing regulations to "adequately
define" this special category and to "provide constitutionally sufficient procedural protections to those aliens."' 20 0 The department also hopes to create stringent release conditions, such as registration requirements and
limitations on certain activities. 2 0 1 These release conditions will "maximize public protection," and if violated, afford the Department a pretext to
20 2
return aliens to custody.
Finally, Attorney General Ashcroft said that the State Department will
pressure aliens' home countries to "live up to their international obligations and repatriate them."' 2 0 3 The Attorney General also took the unusual
step of threatening to direct the State Department not to issue immigrant or
non-immigrant visas to nationals of countries that refuse to accept criminal
aliens from the United States "if necessary to protect the American peo194. See id. at 717.
195. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to INS Acting Commissioner, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,433 (July 19, 2001).
196. See Attorney General Outlines DOJ's Response to Recent Case on Detaining Criminal Aliens, Legal News, 70 U.S. L. WEEK 2077, 2077 (Aug. 7, 2001).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Memorandum for Attorney General John Ashcroft to INS Acting Commissioner,
66 Fed. Reg. 38,433, 38,434 (July 24, 2001).
201. Attorney General Outlines DOJ's Response To Recent Case on Detaining Criminal
Aliens, supra note 196, at 2078.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2077.
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pie."'20 4 He said that this visa sanction would be an "enormous incentive"
20 5
for countries to negotiate repatriation treaties.
The administrative reaction underscores the importance of judicial
review. The government had emphasized that it took the detainees' liberty
interests seriously, that it worked diligently in trying to secure travel documents for these aliens, 20 6 and that the entire process ought to be left to the
executive. 20 7 But with the Supreme Court's ruling in Zadvydas20 8 and the
imminent release of many detained aliens, the administration has found
new vigor in trying to secure repatriation, basically admitting that more
could previously have been done to secure these aliens' release. This kind
of judicial check on government action, and inaction, is a necessary part of
democracy-particularly when fundamental rights are implicated.
Similarly, Attorney General Ashcroft's promise to bring additional
criminal charges against many of these indefinitely detained aliens 20 9 begs
the question: why was that not done before, particularly if there was little
likelihood of repatriation? The government should not have been circumventing the strict constitutional protections of the criminal justice system
by instead relying on an idiosyncrasy of an immigration statute that questionably allowed for indefinite detentions under a far more lenient, discretionary standard. By now bringing additional criminal charges against
these indefinitely detained aliens, the administration implies that it was
doing as much.
Finally, the administration's effort to fit some alien detentions within
the loopholes Zadvydas left open is technically within the letter of the ruling but perhaps not its spirit. The Zadvydas Court did not make a clear-cut
ruling. Because it used an avoidance doctrine, the Court had to make a
concerted effort to affirm and distinguish several narrowly defined civil
detention schemes, all of which contain heightened procedural protections. 21 0 The government thus hopes that a more narrowly defined alien
detention rule that contains increased procedural safeguards will meet con211
stitutional muster.
Note, however, that constructing such a regulation would require more
than simply adding procedural window dressing. The statute would have
to target an especially dangerous group of individuals, and incarceration
should generally not be potentially indefinite. The Zadvydas Court did not
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Brief for Respondents at 7, Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001) (No.
99-7791).
207. See id.
208. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
209. Attorney General Outlines DOJ's Response To Recent Case on Detaining Criminal
Aliens, supra note 196, at 2077.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-48 (1987) (upholding pretrial detention for the "most serious of crimes," provided there are "stringent time
limitations").
211. See Attorney General Outlines DOJ's Response To Recent Case on Detaining Criminal Aliens, supra note 196, at 2077-78.
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rest its decision on the procedural shortfalls surrounding 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6), but instead emphasized the alien's substantive liberty interest. 2 1 2 The Court distinguished constitutional civil confinements allowed

to infringe on liberty interests with the alien detentions under 8 U.S.C.
'2 13
§ 1231(a)(6) by noting that the latter are "potentially permanent.
Thus, an allowable alien detention scheme might, for example, target
deportable aliens whose repatriation is forthcoming, but who have a par21 4
ticularly dangerous trait.
Important political questions would surround any such statute or regulation. If there is an imposing threat to the public from a narrow class of
people-like pedophiles for example-why create a statute that only targets
deportable alien pedophiles and not pedophiles in general (aside, of
course, from animosity towards aliens)? Once a particularly dangerous
threat to the population has been identified, all those who possess that
threat, not just aliens, should be civilly detained. Deportable aliens who
are an overwhelming threat to the general population ought to be confined
under existing civil detention schemes that also apply to the general population. To create new civil detention schemes that only apply to aliens to
circumvent the Zadvydas ruling seems a disingenuous and artificial
remedy.
C.

To Whom Does Zadvydas Apply?

The most important question left clouded by Zadvydas was to whom the
decision actually applies. Attorney General Ashcroft's memorandum reasons that Zadvydas "does not apply to those aliens who are legally still at
our borders or who have been paroled 2 15 into the country (such as Mariel
Cubans)."' 2 16 When nearly 125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States
during the Mariel Boatlift in 1980, the U.S. government declined to legally
admit these aliens and the government instead passed special legislation
labeling them as parolees. 2 17 So, although these aliens have been present
in the United States for over twenty years, for legal purposes the government treats them as if they are still at the border seeking admission. 2 18
Since the Zadvydas decision, most courts that have considered the
issue have concurred with the government's interpretation and have
declined to extend the case's protections to aliens paroled into the coun212. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 696.
213. Id. at 691.
214. See Kansas v. Henricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997). As the Court explained in
Henrichs, "It thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited
subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty." Id.
215. See supra note 144.
216. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to INS Acting Commissioner, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,433, 38,434 (July 19, 2001).
217. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.12 (parole determinations and revocations for Mariel Cubans); GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 144, § 62.01;
see also Costello, supra note 28.
218. For a discussion of the parole concept, see supra note 144.
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try. 21 9 This is certainly a reasonable reading of the opinion. But the issue
2 20
is far from clear-cut. The Minnesota District Court in Borrero v. Aljets
considered the issue in great detail and explicitly ruled that the reasonable
detention time mandated by Zadvydas does, in fact, extend to aliens
paroled into the United States.
Much of this confusion springs from the fact that the Zadvydas Court
purposefully purported not to have ruled on the matter. But Justice Stevens
and the Borrero Court are nonetheless correct that the Zadvydas Court's
method of imposing constitutional checks on the indefinite detention of
resident aliens naturally extends to the treatment of parolees.
The majority opinion in Zadvydas insinuated that its ruling did not
apply to paroled aliens, 22 ' yet much of the Court's more sweeping language
seemed to imply that paroled aliens might deserve Fifth Amendment protection. For example, the Court stated that "[a] statute permitting indefi'22 2
nite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem.
And, the Court noted that the Due Process Clause applies to all "'persons'
within the United States, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent. '22 3 To allow Congress to subvert this constitutional principle by the legislative fiction of parole could strip the Due Process Clause of much of its import. 2 24 Further, depriving parolees of Fifth

Amendment protection while according unlawful immigrants protection
might also have disastrous public policy implications. Such a policy would
essentially promote violation of immigration laws. Unlike illegal immigrants, many parolees have shown respect for our admissions system and
the rule of U.S. law. Often the government resorted to the legal fiction of
parole to admit immigrants because of a lack of flexibility in the immigration laws that the government itself created. Paroled aliens should not lose
out on important constitutional protections because of Congress' legislative failings.
219. See, e.g., Carballo v. INS, No. 99-5698, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21695 at *40 (6th
Cir. Oct. 11, 2001) (finding Zadvydas inapplicable to the detention of an excludable

Mariel Cuban); Vera v. Estrada, No. 3-01-CV-1044-X, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17790 at *3
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2001) (declining to extend Zadvydas' rationale to a Mariel Cuban);
Fernandez-Fajardo v. INS, 193 F. Supp.2d 877, 885 (M.D. La. 2001) (reading Zadvydas'
language to imply that Zadvydas only places a "reasonable time" limitation on the post-

removal-period detention of aliens who have "indeed entered the country; and the Court
would probably treat the excluded aliens differently").
220. Borrero v. AIjets, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (D. Minn. 2001).
221. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 710-11 (2001) (stating that "aliens who
have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different
question").
222. Id. at 690.
223. Id. at 693.

224. If the courts were to accept that parolees lie outside the Fifth Amendment's protections, the government could simply label all immigrants as parolees until they receive
citizenship. Then only citizens would gain Fifth Amendment protection. Such a move
would certainly be at odds with the clear language of the Fifth Amendment and the
Supreme Court's interpretation in Zadvydas. What the government clearly could not do
in the aggregate, it should not be able to do in the particular.
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The Court's constitutional avoidance approach also points to a wider
application of constitutional protection. In his dissent, Justice Kennedy
pointed out that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) permits the detention of both
removable and inadmissible aliens. 2 25 It seems odd, he argued, to read
reasonability into only the detention of removable aliens, and not also into
detention of parolees who are governed by the same section. 2 26 The majority essentially ruled that Congress meant to give the Attorney General discretion to hold an alien past six months only if there is a reasonable
likelihood of repatriation. 2 27 If this standard is to be read into the statute,
as the Court in fact did, it must be read into the entire statute. If it was
Congress' intent to act reasonably, then courts should presume they
intended to act reasonably toward all immigrants.
In applying Zadvydas to parolees, the court in Borrero quoted much of
the more sweeping constitutional language of Zadvydas, but put even more
emphasis on this idea of Congressional intent: "we can find no sound reason to interpret and apply the statute one way for one category of aliens,
but a different way for others.., there is no principled basis for not applying the majority's interpretation of § 1231 (a)(6) to Mariel Cubans. '2 28
The opposing argument is that Congress simply meant to imply a reasonability level commensurate with different immigrants' constitutional
status. Under this rationale, Congress meant to give the Attorney General
the extent of his constitutional authority to detain an immigrant. That
extent varies depending on an immigrant's status.
The other court to have considered the statutory construction angle in
some detail largely followed this alternate route. Reasoning that a "seemingly universal term" can apply "differently to different persons," the court
in Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 229 declined to apply Zadvydas' implied statutory
construction of six months to parolees. 2 30 The court found the statute to
be "capable of sustaining a reasonable interpretation that differentiates
between" paroled and non-paroled immigrants. 23 1 The court then relied
on the severability doctrine to "presume that Congress would have wanted
to sever plainly constitutional from the possibly unconstitutional aspects of
the statute.

' 2 32

Finally, the court found the government's rationale 233 for

detaining parolees "positively perverse," but nonetheless granted the INS
substantial deference and upheld the detention of parolees as
225. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 710-11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Justice Kennedy qualifies this application to dangerous persons and flight risks).
226. Id. at 711.
227. See id. at 701.
228. Borrero v. Aljets, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1042 (D. Minn. 2001).
229. 207 F. Supp. 2d 326 (Dist. NJ. 2002).
230. Id. at 336.
231. Id. at 337.
232. Id.
233. The government argued that continued detention of certain aliens is necessary
to deter tyrants from dumping aliens on U.S. shores. The court, however, pointed out
that tyrants will care little if these aliens are jailed; and tyrants may actually be
encouraged by a policy that would assure that these aliens are jailed rather than able to
sneak back into their native country.
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constitutional.

23 4

But this argument largely rests on the supposed distinction the
Zadvydas Court made between due process rights of resident aliens versus
paroled aliens. Courts 23 5

have reasoned that in declining to extend

Mezei's lessened protections to resident aliens deemed excludable, the
Supreme Court implicitly affirmed Mezei's application of lessened constitutional protections to paroled aliens. 23 6 Courts have added to this argument by pointing to the Zadvydas Court's endorsement of a territorial
distinction in immigration law. 23 7 These arguments go far in explaining
the very sensible proposition put forth in Zadvydas that aliens seeking
admission at our borders do not deserve due process rights. But courts are
reading too much into Zadvydas when they use the opinion to uphold the
legal fictions surrounding parole and deny parolees due process rights.
A reasonable reading of Zadvydas would include parolees within the
Court's due process protection. The Court ruled that the "distinction
between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one
who has never entered runs throughout immigration law." Moreover, the
Court distinguished Mezei by noting that the alien there was "seeking
entry. "238 Parolees in the United States are not at the border "seeking
2 39
entry" like Mezei, but have in fact physically entered the United States.

Further, the Court's sweeping language that all "'persons' within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary or permanent" deserve due process rights places the
bright line at that very territorial distinction of entry into the United States.
If,
according to the Court, illegal immigrants deserve due process protections, then it is not the legal entry, but the physical entry that marks the
due process frontier. Parolees fit squarely within this language, legal fictions notwithstanding. The Zadvydas Court mentioned Mezei only in so
240
much as it prevented its application to aliens ordered deported.
Next, both binding treaty obligations and customary international
legal standards suggest a broader reading of Zadvydas that would extend
protections against indefinite detention to parolees. Courts should interpret 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) in a way that avoids violating international law.
The indefinite imprisonment of aliens contravenes international
human rights guarantees against arbitrary detention. 24 1 In Ma,the Ninth
234. Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 207 F. Supp. 2d 326, 338.
235. See, e.g., Vera v. Estrada, No. 3-01-CV-1044-X, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17790
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2001); Fernandez-Fajardo v. INS, 193 F. Supp. 2d 877 (M.D. La.
2001).
236. For a detailed discussion of why such a reading is unwarranted, see supra Section III.
237. See Carballo v. INS, No. 99-5698, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21695 at *41 (6th Cir.

Oct. 11, 2001).
238. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

239. Id.
2 40. Id.
241. See Brief Amicus Curiae Lawyers Committee For Human Rights In Support of
Respondent Kim Ho Ma, Reno v. Ma (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-38).
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Circuit explicitly recognized "a clear international prohibition" against prolonged arbitrary detention. 24 2 The court noted that Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United States
has ratified, 243 holds that "no one 24 4 shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest
and detention. '2 45 Congress can only abrogate a treaty obligation through
clear legislation explicitly intended to override the treaty-something notably absent in the present case. 24 6 The Ninth Circuit grounded much of its
opinion around the Charming Betsy principle of interpreting statutes so
they are consistent with international law. 24 7 The court ultimately found

that Congress did not intend to abrogate its treaty obligations by enacting
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 24 8 The Ninth Circuit thus harmonized the statute
with U.S. treaty obligations by reading an implicit requirement of reasonability into the statute.

2 49

The Supreme Court failed to address the Ninth Circuit's international
law arguments. 25 0 The Court found 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to be ambiguous, but it chose to read an implicit reasonability limitation into the statute
based only on constitutional considerations. 25' While the constitutional
arguments surrounding the resident aliens at issue in Zadvydas may differ
from those surrounding parolees, international law would seem to apply
equally to both groups of aliens. 2 52 8 U.S.C. § 12.31(a)(6) is ambiguous
and contains no clear intent to deviate from U.S. treaty obligations. Therefore, our treaty commitments compel courts to apply the statute vis-a-vis
parolees in the same manner in which the Ninth Circuit applied it to resident aliens. The statute, then, can only allow for the reasonable detention
of parolees.
Further, an evolving body of customary international law expressly
proscribes arbitrary detention. The Universal Declaration of Human
242. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 830 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Martinez v. City of Los
Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998)).
243. See 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-84 (Apr. 2, 1992); Ma, 208 F.3d at 830.
244. The United States government would likely invoke the fiction of parole and
argue that "no one" excludes parolees whom the government considers not actually in
the United States.
245. Ma, 208 F.3d at 830; see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature,Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at
54, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 9(1).
246. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1)(a) ("An Act of Congress
supercedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supercede the earlier rule or
provision is clear and if the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled"); United
States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
247. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804); Ma, 208 F.3d at
829 -30.
248. Ma, 208 F.3d at 830.
249. Id. at 830-31
250. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
251. Id. at 688-99 (the Court's constitutional avoidance rested on this presumption).
252. See GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 144, § 108.04 ("international
law applies equally to resident noncitizens and to parolees").
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Rights reads: "No one shall be arbitrarily arrested, detained, or exiled." 2 53
The American Convention on Human Rights states that "every person has
the right to personal liberty and security ....
No one shall be subject to
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. ' 25 4 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law argues that a state violates international law if is "practices,
encourages, or condones .

.

. prolonged arbitrary detention. ' 25 5 The UN

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has reasoned that detention
becomes "arbitrary" when a detainee is "kept in detention after the completion of his sentence." 2 56 The European Court of Human Rights has ruled
257
states can only detain aliens pending extradition for a reasonable time.
In a case quite similar to Zadvydas, the European Court of Human Rights
court ruled that an eighteen-month incarceration violates the European
Convention's prohibition against arbitrary detention. 258 And, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has expressed concerns about
the practical effects of the indefinite detention on asylum seekers and
refugees.259
If this body of international law has evolved to a generally accepted
norm of customary international law, then U.S. courts must treat it as federal common law. 2 60 The Attorney General's decision to incarcerate aliens
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) arguably serves as a controlling executive act
253. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 9, U.N.G.A. Res.
217A (llI), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
254. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art. 7, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123.
255.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §

702.

256. Report of the Working Group on ArbitraryDetention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4./1998/44
(1997).
257. See Quinn v. France, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, 529 (1996).
258. As the European Court of Human Rights explained:
[ilt is clear from the wording of both the French and English versions of Article
5(1)( 0 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms that deprivation of liberty under this subparagraph will
be justified only for as long as extradition proceedings are being conducted. It
follows that if such proceedings are not being prosecuted with due diligence, the
detention will cease to be justified under Article 5(1)( 0 .
Id. at 550.
259. Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Feb. 10, 1999). As the
High Commissioner has stated:
[t]he inability of stateless persons who have left their country of habitual residence to return to their countries has been a reason for unduly prolonged or
arbitrary detention of these persons in third countries. Similarly, individuals
whom the State of nationality refuses to accept back on the basis that nationality
was withdrawn or lost while they were out of the country, or who are not
acknowledged as nationals without proof of nationality, which in the circumstances is difficult to acquire, have also been held in prolonged or indefinite
detention only because the question of where to send them remains unsolved.
Id.
260. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 677 (1900) (stating "international law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts. . ."); see also Kadic
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding it a "settled proposition that federal common law incorporates international law").
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that could override this common law. 26 1 Nonetheless, courts should use
this body of international law to better understand our treaty obligations,
and better interpret congressional intent in enacting the statute. If Congress intended to give the Attorney General the power to act in a way so
contradictory to international law, one would have expected Congress to
have done so more explicitly.
Finally, even if courts ultimately fail to apply the Zadvydas decision to
parolees, the opinion will surely put great strain on the very concept of
parole. If the statute is not applied equally to resident aliens and parolees
an albeit odd legal fiction created to deal with administrative irregularities
could mean the difference between six months and a lifetime of incarceration. This huge difference in treatment would largely hinge on the label the
government chooses to attach to an incoming alien.
Conclusion: The Half Left to be Done
The Zadvydas opinion reasserted judicial review, lessened the plenary deference accorded the other branches on immigration matters, and upheld
important due process protections for some aliens. But the opinion made
few decisive constitutional decisions, and left important questions unanswered. Since Zadvydas the legislative and popular landscape surrounding
immigration law generally, and detentions in particular, has changed dramatically. The Court will undoubtedly soon confront constitutional challenges to the indefinite detention of parolees, to administrative retooling of
indefinite detention generally, and to the immigration provisions of the
USA PATRIOT Act.2 6 2 The Court should approach these situations with
the same scrutinizing and skeptical attitude it displayed in Zadvydas. The
next time, though, the escape hatch of constitutional avoidance will likely
not be available. Decisive and complete decisions will have to be made.

261. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding the Attorney
General's decision to indefinitely confine aliens to be a controlling executive act that
overrides any customary international law to the contrary).
262. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001).

